Marriage and Employment Participation with Wage Bargaining in Search Equilibrium by Bonilla R & Trejos A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Bonilla R, Trejos A. (2017) 
Marriage and Employment Participation with Wage Bargaining in Search 
Equilibrium.  
CESifo Working Paper Series, 6543 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-
papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19333470  
 
 
Copyright: 
© The authors. 
 
Date deposited:   
20/07/2017 
Marriage and Employment Participation with
Wage Bargaining in Search Equilibrium.
Roberto Bonilla
Newcastle University
Alberto Trejos
INCAE
Abstract
The empirical literature addressing links between the labor and
the marriage markets is numerous and varied. Despite this, the the-
oretical (equilibrium) literature that explicitly links the two markets
is less developed, particularly so with frictional markets. We build
an equilibrium search model where married couples make joint deci-
sions on home production and labor market participation. We then
analyze the implications of our results for a frictional marriage mar-
ket allowing us to consider the interaction between both markets.
A worker´s bargaining position reects their own productivity, and
also the employment status and conditions of their spouse. We nd
that couples with very di¤erent productivities have di¤erent strategies
regarding labor market participation. In symmetric couples, the part-
ners behave symmetrically. Workers get better job o¤ers when their
spouses are employed, and in some equilibria a person may search for
transitory jobs with the sole purpose of raising the long-term wages
of their spouse. In some cases, rms unilaterally increase a workers
wage in order to reduce turnover, by ensuring that the spouse stays at
home. Whether rms follow that strategy or not may be a matter of
multiple equilibria, depending on parameter values. All this provides
an additional explanation for wage and search behavior heterogeneity
of similar workers and/or couples.
Keywords: labour market participation, wage formation, marriage
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1 Introduction
The empirical literature addressing links between the labor and the marriage
markets is numerous and varied. Despite this, the theoretical (equilibrium)
literature that explicitly links the two markets is less developed, particularly
so with frictional markets. To cite only a few empirical empirical contribu-
tions with results related to our equilibrium model, Bloemen and Stancanelli
(2014) nd that the wages of one spouse reduce the market labor supply
and increase the home production hoursof the other spouse.1 Korenman
and Newmark (1991) is among the many pieces to document empirically a
premium in wages for married men; others have elaborated that this rela-
tionship is stronger or more robust among married men with working wives.
Among them, Jacobsen and Rayak (1996) show the data is consistent with
the explanation that the wife´s income allows the husband to search for bet-
ter jobs. Song (2006) nds that the relationship is positive except when the
wife is in management (which perhaps can be interpreted as her being in the
labor market permanently rather than transitorily). Other papers show a
positive e¤ect of one spouse´s earnings (or educational status) on the wages
of the other spouse: see for instance Tiefenthaler (1994), Rosetti and Tanda
(2000) or Huang (2009), for Brazilian, Italian and Chinese data respectively.
All these empirical results are consistent with the ndings in this paper. We
believe that there is a shortage of theoretical (equilibrium) literature address-
ing the link between these two markets, and our aim is to contribute towards
lling that void.
We develop an equilibrium search model where agents enter the econ-
omy in married couples, with both partners unemployed, and individuals
have a decision to allocate their e¤orts among employment and home pro-
duction. We focus on parameters such that the complementarity between
wage income and the value of home production is so high that every couple
will nd optimal to always have someone at home2. We assume wages are
1In this case, the e¤ects are di¤erent in nature between men and women. In particular:
"The wage of the father has a signicantly negative e¤ect on the mother´s market hours,
while her wage rate has a signicantly positive e¤ect on his house work hours." We do not
allow for gender di¤erences in our model, which prevents us from capturing these nuances.
2If we think of "home production" as chores, a higher income allows the couple, for
instance, to acquire the appliances and other equipments that make those chores to be
more pleasant or more e¢ cient. If we think of home production as leisure, a higher income
buys things that make it more fun.
In Bonilla and Trejos (2015) we look at other parameters in which the choice about
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determined by bargaining between rms and potential employees, and nd
several interesting results: First, because the bargaining position of a worker
is stronger when their spouse has a higher income, married people´s income
is correlated in that the better paid you are, the higher pay your spouse can
bargain. This generates a correlation in spouse earnings that does not arise
directly from, but a¤ects, the degree of assortative.. Second, we nd equi-
libria where the spouse with lower earning potential transitorily goes to the
job market, just to improve with their salary the bargaining power of their
partner; or refrains at all from labor market participation. This makes family
income inequality larger than individual income inequality. Third, for some
parameter values, it may be an equilibrium outcome that the more produc-
tive spouse stays at home and the less productive one remains the sole bread
winner, obviously an ine¢ cient arrangement. Fourth, for fairly productive
couples where the productivities are not too apart (but also not too similar),
we nd that employers prefer to unilaterally increase the wage of the more
productive spouse in order to reduce turnover by ensuring that the spouse
stays at home. Throughout, we call this a "bribe". This compresses the up-
per part of the wage distribution relative to the productivity distribution as
some relatively productive workers see their wage increased. Sixth, for some
couples there may be multiple equilibrium wages and job search strategies.
The multiple equilibria results from the feedback between a unilateral wage
increase by the rm and the e¤ects of this on individual wages: if rms follow
this strategy in equilibrium, this increases the workers bargaining position
vis-a-vis an individual rm. This makes the bribe required lower relative to
the otherwise agreed wage, and thus more likely to be optimal.
We derive some interesting results related to the relative productivities
of partners. First, in our model, productive equality among partners is in-
e¢ cient: with two high productivity workers within a marriage and one of
them staying at home, this as waste of eithers high productivity (also, not
necessarily the least productives). Second, the degree of within marriage
heterogeneity a¤ects both the labor-search behavior of individuals and the
wages that they can bargain. Hence, when the economy consists of more
unequal marriages, there is an increase in heterogeneity both in the search
behavior and wages of seemingly equal agents and/or couples. This is re-
sult is strengthened by the fact that we nd multiple equilibria in the labor
whether to be a two-income family is relevant. We simplify matters here in order to focus
on the wage and bargaining problem.
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market for some types of couples, which provides an additional source of
heterogeneity in search and wages.
These results are related to class formation -as in the seminal work by
Burdett and Coles (1997)-, and more generally to assortative matching. Our
modeling of the labor market has interesting implications for the modeling
of, and the consequences from, a marriage market. This because some of the
outcomes are in stark contrast with the assumptions in Burdett and Coles
(1997). We nd that, for newly born marriages: a) The utility within mar-
riage depends on own productivity in addition to the partners productivity,
b) Utility within marriage is not monotonic on the partners productivity, and
c) Agents di¤er on the ranking between any two potential spouses. Both
b) and c) stem from the "bribe" discussed above. We discuss the impli-
cations of this for marriage formation, and in turn the implications of this
for our results in the labor market. Our conclusion is that the e¤ects of
an increase in the rate at which potential spouses are found depend on the
rate at which jobs are found. For low job arrival rates, if it is easy to nd
potential partners this tends to favor assortative matching, thus making rele-
vant the ine¢ ciency found in marriages between highly productive partners.
If it is di¢ cult to nd potential spouses this weakens assortative matching
and generates di¤erent types of couples in equilibrium, thus magnifying the
prevalent heterogeneity in wages and search behavior. These results are
partially reversed when job arrival rates are high.
This theoretical work relates to Violante et al. (2012), which charac-
terizes the reservation wage strategies of married individuals who face an
exogenous distribution of wages within a frictional labor market, to obtain
results related to link between marital status and labor market participa-
tion. In Bonilla and Trejos (2015), we develop a very similar model without
wage bargaining to study the equilibrium combinations of labor participa-
tion strategy that may emerge, and their e¢ ciency properties. Bonilla and
Kiraly (2013) and Bonilla et al. (2015) derive a marriage wage premium as
the consequence of the interaction between the labor and marriage markets.
The analysis of the issue with non-frictional markets is more extensive.
A deep treatment can be found in Grossbard (2015), which is based on the
pioneering work by Becker. The starting motivation there seems to be similar
to ours, in that it is natural to analyze the feedback between decisions in the
marriage and labor markets, and parameters and events in one of them will
a¤ect decisions in the other one. Some of our assumptions are more in line
with traditional theoretical search literature than to the above literature..
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Mainly, we assume utility is linear in income and value of home production,
and we assume that labor market participation is a binary decision. We
believe expanding on these assumptions is a fruitful avenue for further work.
We describe the environment in Section 2, and derive and analyze the
equilibrium in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss our results, and we conclude
in Section 5.
2 The environment
Time is continuous and continues forever. The population is a continuum
of measure of innitely lived agents arranged in pairs, who discount future
consumption at rate r. Each agent is endowed at birth by an observable
productivity p 2 [p; p], taken from the distribution function F (p).
Agents enter the economy married, with both spouses unemployed. An
unemployed worker can search for potential employers at a search cost ";
we assume " > 0 but look at the limit case where " ! 0. Firms will be
found through Poisson process, with arrival rate . Employed workers cannot
search. All employers (rms) are identical and able to generate costlessly as
many vacancies as they want, and only workers matched with a rm are
able to produce. Hence, as long as a job is protable the rm does not
need to terminate it to make room for others, and its interaction with one
potential employee is not a¤ected by quantity or qualities of its other current
or potential workers. Upon a match, rm and worker enter a bargaining
game to decide the wages, with full information regarding the productivity
and working history of the worker and the worker´s spouse. Both partners
in a couple share all aspects of their life, so they enjoy the same (joint) utility
from their joint income and joint home production3. In any given couple,
we use H to refer to the most productive partner and L to refer to the least
productive partner.
3Notice there is no mention of gender in this formulation. This can be interpreted in
two ways. One, simply, that each being of the others preferred gender is part of what
we call "compatibility". Another is that everybody can match with everybody else. The
formulation and equilibria are equivalent, on the other hand, to assuming that there are
two genders, the distribution of all relevant parameters is equal among both, and we focus
on symmetric equilibria. In any event, for exposition purposes we may assume at times a
gender language (he and she, husband and wife, etc.).
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The bargaining game that determines wages is as follows: Upon meeting,
the rm o¤ers a wage, which the worker may accept of reject. If the worker
rejects it, then after a small wait of duration  either party has a probability
1=2 of making the second (and nal) o¤er. If that one is also rejected,
the pair breaks o¤. We are interested of course on the limit case as  !
0.4 If either o¤er is accepted, that contract is binding. The only way to
alter the commitment is by quitting the job (there is no within-the-match
renegotiation). For now, we assume that any worker who quits a job must
also leave the labor market forever; we discuss the implications of relaxing
this assumption in Section 4.
Not only income purchases goods that can be enjoyed directly, but the
value of home production increases with income as well (that, for instance,
enables to acquire household goods that complement home work). To obtain
home production, however, requires at least one spouse to stay at home, and
in absolute terms all agents are equally productive at home. We denote  the
marginal e¤ect that income has as an enhancer of home production, which
is then h+ w. For starters, we will assume  = 1, which implies that joint
utility is U = w1+w2 if both are employed at those wages, U = 2w+h when
one spouse is earning w and the other one is at home, and U = h if both are
jobless. We discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption to  < 1 in
Section 4.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The labor market
Because  = 1, we know that at any given time at most one spouse in each
couple will be employed:
Lemma 1 Given  = 1, a) it is never optimal for both spouses to be em-
ployed and keep their jobs simultaneously; b) if one spouse is employed, the
other spouse would only search for a new job if in equilibrium she would get
a higher wage; c) if H is employed at a wage w  pL, then L is o¤ the labor
4This is the bargaining game used in Bonilla and Burdett (2010). As there, this depar-
ture from the more standard Nash bargaining option is justied because in this environ-
ment the choice set may not be convex, and hence the axiomatic Nash solution may not
exist.
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market, while there is no wage in equilibrium payable to L such that H
would leave the labor market.
Proof. a) Assume for a moment both spouses are working, and let the
least paid spouse (not necessarily H, because L may have been in a stronger
bargaining position than H when their wages got determined) make w and
the best paid one make W > w: While keeping both, they enjoy a ow
utility of W + w, (there are no exogenous breakups, and no search on-the-
job, to break that ow), while the moment the worker least paid quits (and
thus leaves the labor market) the couple enjoy a ow (also uninterrupted)
of 2W + h > W + w. b) Since search is costly, one only looks for a job if
expecting that one may take it. c) Independent of the outside options and
bargaining position, the highest wage that L can be o¤ered is pL. By virtue
of the previous point, such wage would not be acceptable if H is already
making w  pL. The same does not apply in the other direction, since
paying w  pH to L leaves the employer with negative prot.
In principle, a newlywed couple may decide that both spouses search
in the labor market from the outset. On the other hand, they may also
choose that initially only of one of them searches, delaying the expected
arrival of their rst income (since two searching will nd on average before
only one searching), but securing the order in which their jobs are going to
come. This could happen because, with bargaining, an agent with a better
paid spouse has stronger outside options, and gets o¤ered a higher wage.
Then, the winning strategy for a couple that desires H to be the long-term
breadwinner of the family could be to have L look a job rst, to ensure
that H´s wage is higher. While in the end we will prove that this does not
happen in equilibrium and both spouses search from the outset, to prove it
we need to allow for these possibilities. We will call 0 the probability that
H searches when both partners could and neither is working, and 1 the
analogous probability for L. It is straightforward to show that when L gets
a job before H (whether both or only L were searching), it is always optimal
for H to search. We will dene 2 as the probability that L searches for a
job given that H nds a job rst
To complete the notation: if spouse k 2 fH;Lg is the rst one to nd
a job, we denote w1k their resulting wage. If, on the contrary, her partner
is already employed at salary w when k nds a job, then the wage will be
w2k(w). The value function of the state where both agents are unemployed
and eligible to search is denoted V00. The value of having H employed and
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earning w while L is not working is denoted V10 if L is able to search, and
V H if L has already quit a job and been forced to leave the labor market.
Analogously, the state where L working and earning w while H searching
has value V01, and the state where H has left the labor market is V L. We
will not need to use V11 (since it is never optimal for both spouses to work
at the same time, given  = 1, h > 0).
The Bellman equations write now as
rV00 = h+ 0[V10
 
w1H
  V00] + 1 V01  w1L  V00 (1)
rV01
 
w1L

= 2w1L + h+ 

V H
 
w2H
 
w1L
  V01  w1L
rV10
 
w1H

= 2w1H + h+ 2

V L
 
w2L
 
w1H
  V10  w1H
rV H
 
w2H

= 2w2H + h
rV L
 
w2L

= 2w2L + h
where the probabilities i describe the optimal search strategies, by virtue
of Lemma 1, and must satisfy the incentive compatibility conditions
0 =

1
0
V10 (w
1
H) > V00
otherwise
(2)
1 =

1
0
V01 (w
1
L) > V00
otherwise
2 =

1
0
w1H < pL
otherwise
Recall that when bargaining for a wage, the rm always makes the rst
o¤er, knowing that if rejected then, after a wait ! 0, the denitive coun-
tero¤er will be made by either party with probability 1=2. Normally, the rm
would o¤er the wage that makes the worker indi¤erent between accepting it,
or rejecting it and getting a 50-50 chance of making the second and nal o¤er
(assuming that if the rm makes the second o¤er, it would extract all the
surplus). For instance, when the rm is bargaining with H over w2H , because
L is already employed and earning w1L with value V01, the equilibrium o¤er
w2H is dened by
V H
 
w2H
  V01  w1L = 12 V H (pH)  V01  w1L (3)
The left hand side represents the gain from the worker of accepting that o¤er:
it will earn w2H forever, while her spouse L stays at home therefore securing
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a permanent ow utility of 2w2H +h, while leaving behind the value V01. The
right hand side represents the gain for the worker of rejecting the o¤er: it
will get cleaned out for no surplus in the event, with probability 1=2; that
the rm makes the second o¤er, yet it will get, also with probability 1=2,
the entire surplus, by being paid perpetually a wage pH . In equilibrium the
rm makes the o¤er that barely gets accepted, thus equating the left and
right hand sides. A similar logic applies for the determination of w1L and w
2
L,
which delivers
V01
 
w1L
  V00 = 1
2
[V01 (pL)  V00] (4)
V L
 
w2L
  V10  w1H = 12 V L (pL)  V10  w1H (5)
The analysis of the bargaining to determine w1H is much more compli-
cated. One could think that the rm o¤ers a wage w that emerges from an
equation analogous to (4), but this would be wrong: the right hand side of
(4) reects the expected payo¤ for the L of rejecting the rm´s rst o¤er,
and getting to make the second. In that case, L would demand to be paid
pL, in the knowledge that H continues searching (so the continuation value
is V01(pL)). If the same thing happened when H is bargaining, H knows that
upon demanding pH in the second round, L would not continue searching,
because no rm would want to pay it more than pH , so the continuation
value is not V10(pH) but rather V H(pH). Therefore, the minium acceptable
wage for the rm to o¤er is w; satisfying
V10(w
)  V00 = 1
2

2pH + h
r
  V00

(6)
and, if w  pL, this is what will happen. Please note w  pL is only
consistent with using 2 = 0 in V10(w): In the event w < pL (consistent
only with 2 = 1 in V10(w)) then there are two possibilities. The rst one
is is for the rm to o¤er wage w, in which case she knows that the workers
partner (the L) will search on the job, eventually nd a better job, inducing
H to quit. In this case, the rms expected lifetime discounted prot from
o¤ering w is pH w

r+
: The second option is for the rm to pay pL : she would
make a lower ow prot, but the ow would continue forever, and then the
discounted lifetime prot would be pH pL
r
. We colloquially refer to this last
choice as "bribing" L, as the rm in a way is o¤ering an extra payment to H,
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in order to induce L to stay at home.5 Clearly, the rm would prefer to bribe
and pay pL, instead of w < pL, if and only if
pH pL
r
> pH w

r+
, or g(w)  0,
where
g(w)  pH + w
r   (r + )pL
r(r + )
There is one other complication: in the event bribing did not happen
in the rst o¤er of the bargaining game, we need to consider whether it is
reasonable to expect the rm would bribe if it got to make a second o¤er.
This second o¤er would never be observed along the equilibrium path, but its
value a¤ects the wages one does observe. To discuss this, it is useful to dene
two alternative values for w1H , called w and ew, as follows: w is the minimum
wage that H is willing to accept in the second round of the bargaining game
(notice that clearly w < w), while ew is the lowest wage H is willing to
accept in the rst round, given an expectation that the rm would make a
bribing o¤er of pL in the second round (and clearly ew > pL). These values
are implicitly dened by
V10 (w) = V00 (7)
V10( ew)  V00 = 1
2

2pH + h
r
  V00

+
1
2

2pL + h
r
  V00

Which of these values of w1H will be o¤ered by the rm in the rst iteration
of the bargaining game, and always accepted, in equilibrium? From the
previous analysis, it follows that
w1H =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
pL () g (w)  0; w < pL and g (w) > 0
ew () w < pL and g (w) > 0
w ()
i) w < pL and g (w)  0 or
ii) pL 2 [w;w] and g (w)  0 or
iii) w  pL
(8)
5Notice that this dilemma only arises when the rm is bargaining with H and L is still
eligible to search, that is, over w1H . By Lemma 1, if the situation was reversed, and the
negotiation involved L instead of H, the rm would know that anything that is protable
to o¤er L will be topped eventually by H´s eventual employer, so there is no way of
avoiding turnover. And in the event where rm and worker bargain while the spouse is
employed, that is, when determining w2H or w
2
Lthe rm would know that bribing is not
necessary, as the couple has no outside search option after the employed spouse quits and
leaves the labor market.
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The condition in the rst line implies that even though rms would not
bribe if they got to make a second o¤er, or g (w)  0, they still prefer to bribe
in the rst (g (w)  0; w < pL). The condition in the second line implies
that the rm would prefer to bribe in the event it reached the second stage
- and hence a bribe on the rst stage is not necessary. The condition in the
rst subcase of the third line means that it is not protable for the rm to
bribe in either stage (It is easy to show that if it is not protable to bribe in
the rst stage assuming no bribe in the second stage, then it is not protable
to bribe in the second stage.). The condition in the second subcase means
bribe is not necessary in the rst stage even if there is no bribe in the last
stage. The condition in the last case means that bribe is not necessary in
the second stage because there is bribe in the last stage. Since ew > pL and
w > w, the conditions in (8) describe all the possibilities.
Denition 1 An equilibrium is a combination V =

V00; V10; V01; V H ; V L
	
,
 = f0; 1; 2g and w = fw1L; w1H ; w2L (w1H) ; w2H (w1L)g that satisfy (1)-(6)
and (8), given (7).
The set of potential equilibria is made much simpler by the following
result, that implies both spouses enter the labor market the moment they
marry, when they are both unemployed:
Lemma 2 In all equilibria, 0 = 1 = 1
Proof. We consider the di¤erent other possibilities one by one, to verify
they are not best strategies.
1. Obviously, 0 = 1 = 0 could never be part of a best search strat-
egy, because a deviation where either agent searches would increase
expected income at no cost, as 2w + h > h always.
2. The choices 0 = 1; 1 = 0 cannot be optimal. A one-time deviation
to 1 = 1 does not change the moment when H will nd a job; mean-
while, with probability 1=2 it has no e¤ect on the outcome, and with
probability 1=2 it increases ow payo¤ for a fraction of the time before
that moment when H nds a job from h to h + 2w1L > h, and ow
payo¤ after that moment from w1H to w
2
H > w
1
H . Both changes are
strictly positive so this one-time deviation from equilibrium represents
an improvement, which means that 0 = 1; 1 = 0 are not an optimal
choice.
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3. To verify that the choices 0 = 0; 1 = 1 cannot be optimal, one needs
to check several cases, depending on whether, o¤ the equilibrium path
if there was a deviation to 0 = 1, one would observe a) rms do not
bribe, yet w1H > pL, so 2 = 0; or b) rms do not bribe, while w
1
H < pL,
so 2 = 1; or c) rms bribe so 2 = 0; w1H = pL. If, down all of those
paths, it turns out that V10 < V00, that would verify that the one-time
deviation to 0 = 1 would not pay o¤, and thus that equilibria with
0 = 0; 1 = 1 exists. However, it is straightforward to demonstrate
that:
(a) Assuming w1H = ew one can verify that V10 V00 = 2(2rpL+pH)(2r+)2 > 0,
so a one shot deviation to 1 = 1 is always payo¤-improving.
(b) The previous statement is true independently of whether ew  pL
and 2 = 0, or ew < pL and 2 = 1.
(c) Consider now the case where there is bribing, and agents expect
o¤ the equilibrium path w1H = pL, 2 = 0. Then, for V10 <
V00, pL <
2pH
4r2+2r+2
, and for pL > ew one needs pL > (2+r)pH2r2+2r+2 .
Obviously, both inequalities cannot be true at the same time, and
therefore a couple that expected bribing would prefer H to enter
the market immediately, rather than wait for L to nd a job before
H searches.
On the basis of the lemma and the analysis so far, a search equilibrium
is characterized by the values of 2 and w1H :We can infer that there are four
qualitatively di¤erent types of outcomes that may emerge as equilibrium in
this model. The rst one (we shall call it Type A) is the situation where rms
do not bribe (pay w1H = w
 < pL) and L searches when H nds a job rst
(2 = 1). In the other three, L never searches if H nds a job rst, either
because the rm bribes in the rst o¤er (Type B, w1H = pL), because the rm
would pay a bribe in second o¤er and then pay even more in the rst (Type
C, w1H = ~w), or because the wage is so naturally high that bribing is not
necessary (Type D, w1H = w
 > pL). Notice that wages in Equilibria A and
D are in both cases given by the unconstrained outcome of the bargaining
process: w1H = w
, but for opposite reasons. In the former, because L is
so productive that bribing is too expensive; in the latter, because it is so
unproductive that bribing is not necessary.
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Using this characterization we describe the existence conditions in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 There is always at least one pure strategy equilibrium. There
exist functions xi < 1 such that:
i) A type A outcome is an equilibrium if x5 <
pL
pH
< 1
ii) A type B outcome is an equilibrium if maxfx1; x4g < pLpH < x6.
iii) A type C outcome is an equilibrium if x0 <
pL
pH
< x3:
iv) A type D outcome is an equilibrium if either x2 <
pL
pH
< x4; or
pL
pH
< x0:
Proof. Consider rst the existence of an equilibrium where 2 = 1, w1H = w
;
solve (1), (3) - (6) to obtain candidate values for VHL; wik; w; ew and w: The
conditions (2) and (8) are pL > w, g(w)  0, V00 < minfV01; V10g and
g(w)  0, which in turn translate into pL=pH  2(r+)24r2+5r+22 , pL=pH 
3(r+)
2r2+4r+32
and pL=pH  2(r+)(r+3)4r2+9r+62  x5, with the only binding inequality
being the last one.
Follow the same logic for an equilibriumwith bribing, where 2 = 0, w1H = pL,
and verify that the conditions cannot be satised when g(w) > 0, so this is
an equilibrium only when g(w)  0, w  pL, V00 < minfV01; V10g and
g(w)  0. These translate into x1  pL=pH  x6 when 2r   and
x4  pL=pH  x6 when 2r > , where x1 = (4r+7)4r2+6r+72 , x4 = 2(r+)
2
4r2+5r+22
and
x6 =
2(r+2)2
4r2+9r+82
.
Notice that x6 > x5, so in the interval between them there is both an equi-
librium with 2 = 0 and 2 = 1.
Identical procedures allow one to conclude that 2 = 0, w1H = ew in equilib-
rium only if x0  pL=pH  x3, where x0  (r+)(2r+2+2r2) and x3  (3r+4)2(r2+2r+22) ,
and by the same token that 2 = 0, w1H = w
 in equilibrium in two cases: one
for g(w) < 0 which exists only if x2 < pL=pH < x4, which only can happen
if 2r >  and where x2  3(r+)2r2+4r+32 ; another for w > pL, which happens to
exist whenever pL=pH < x0.
Notice that x1 and x2 are both smaller than x3 in the relevant intervals, so
there are regions where multiple equilibria with 2 = 0 exist.
Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the proposition.
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Equilibrium regions in pL=pH ;  space
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Intuitively, the proposition tells us that in equilibrium bribing will not be
protable (its too expensive) when pH and pL are very similar, and it will
not be necessary (spouse H gets very well paid anyway) when pH and pL are
very di¤erent. Intermediate levels of pL=pH render bribing protable.
Furthermore, these areas overlap, so we have couples for whom both
2 = 0 and 2 = 1 correspond to equilibrium search behavior, other couples
for which there are equilibria with and without bribing, and others for which
two di¤erent non-bribing wages may emerge.
The graphs also illustrate the possibility of multiple equilibria. The or-
ange region labelled A&B implies there are couples pH ; pL where, given the
expectation that the rm would bribe, it is worthwhile for the rm to do so,
and if there exists the opposite expectation it is also self-fullling. In these
cases, the worker is strictly better o¤ in the equilibrium with the bribe. Sim-
ilarly, in the green region labelled B&C, if agents expect the rm to bribe
it is rational for them to do so, and if they expect to be paid an even higher
wage that makes bribing una¤ordable, the stronger bargaining position asso-
ciated with that expectation makes it also an equilibrium. Finally, the blue
region labelled C&D involves two non-bribing equilibrium levels for w1H ; the
di¤erence between the two is in the expectation about what would happen,
o¤ the equilibrium path, in the event of a rejection and second o¤er in the
bargaining game. This is specied in the following:
Corollary 1 For some parameter values, there are pL; pH combinations for
which multiple types of allocations can be equilibrium. In particular, for a
certain constant   :
 For couples that satisfy x5 < pLpH < x6 is satised, equilibrium may
entail an outcome of type A or of type B.
 For couples that satisfy x1 < pLpH < x3 (given  > 2r), and for couples
that satisfy x4 <
pL
pH
< x3 (given  r <  < 2r), equilibrium may entail
an outcome of type B or of type C.
 For couples that satisfy x2 < pLpH < x4 (given  r <  < 2r), and for
couples that satisfy x2 <
pL
pH
< x3 (given  <  r), equilibrium may
entail an outcome of type C or of type D.
Proof. It is easy to show that x5 < x6 and x1 < x3 and x2 < x3: Further
x1 > x4; x2 if  > 2r; x2 < x4 if  < 2r; x4 < x3 if  r <  < 2r and x3 < x4
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if  <  r.6
The reason for the multiple equilibria is quite intuitive: when rms bribe
some workers in equilibrium, this increases the workers bargaining position
vis-a-vis an individual rm, making the bribe required lower relative to the
otherwise agreed wage, and thus more likely to be optimal.
4 Discussion
Notice, for Type A couples (bribing does not take place and partners always
keep searching until the rst one to nd a job is the one who stays at home),
we have ine¢ cient outcomes in about half of them: we will see the more
productive spouse staying at home and the least productive working in the
market. This represents a loss because both are equally good at home pro-
duction, but not in the market. The loss, on the other hand, is not very big
because the di¤erence in productivities is small.
This ine¢ ciency arises in part because we have chosen to make assump-
tions (namely,  = 1) that emphasize the complementarity between home
work and market work. If one allowed some complementarity between the
market work of the two spouses instead (for instance, if ow payo¤, as a
function of pH and pL, was homogenous of a degree larger than one) then the
outcome would be more compatible with optimality. But by making assump-
tions that imply that it is always optimal for one spouse to stay at home,
we shut down this possibility. But the underlying message will still carry
some truth given some degree of complementarity between home and market
work7: that if one person staying at home is a common enough optimal move
across the whole space of the marriages observed in equilibrium, then welfare
would increase if one could swap L in a very productive couple with H in a
very unproductive one. In all other cases, it is the L type who will stay at
home, and that is e¢ cient.
Our model yields a source of wage distribution for equal workers not
studied before : wages for equally productive workers may di¤er because
6Note that as  ) 1, we have x0 = ::::x6 = 1; and only Type C equilibrium exists.
This is e¢ cient given only one of the partners will work at any given time: While unem-
ployed, both nd a job at the same rate. If the job is found by the L rst, she works only
until H nds a job. If the job is found rst by H, she works for ever.
7As long as the very general conditions for an assortative equilibrium hold.
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they are married to partners of di¤erent productivity and/or because the
order in which partners found jobs was di¤erent (since this has an impact
on bargaining positions). The existence of multiple equilibrium adds a third
source of possible heterogeneity. For the same reasons, our model also results
in heterogeneity in search behavior in addition to wage heterogeneity.
4.1 Implications for and of a marriage market
Consider an agent of productivity pi married to an agent of productivity
pj  pi. Then:
i) The discounted value upon entering the economy, V00 depends on pi in
addition to pj. This follows immediately from the analysis above. Hence,
we use V00(pi; pj) to highlight this dependence.
ii) V00(pi; pj) is not monotonic on pj: Assume for a moment that in the
region of multiple equilibria between A and B, Equilibrium B prevails. It
can be shown that, for very small "; V B00 (pi; pix5   ") > V A00(pi; pix5) : For
pj = pix5   "; the couple is a Type B couple where the pi spouse will be
bribed by the employer if he nds a job rst. As pj increases marginally to
pj = pix5 there is a discrete loss in utility since the couple is now a Type A
marriage where the pi spouse will not be bribed. As a result, the pi spouse
prefers marriage to a pj = pix5   " over pj = pix5:
iii) Not all agents rank potential partners in the same order. Following
from the discussion in ii) above, for di¤erent pi, the value pj = pix5 at which
V00(pi; pj) drops discretely (as it changes from V B00 to V
A
00) is di¤erent.
Consider for a moment a stage previous to our labor market: Agents are
born single and enter a marriage market, where they can search (at a minimal
but positive search cost ) and encounter potential romantic interests. For
two people to be able to marry they require to be compatible, which is a
binary and reciprocal characteristic: two people are either compatible or they
are not, without degrees of compatibility or uncorresponded feelings. The
matching process delivers a Poisson arrival rate  of compatible spouses. If
two agents that meet nd each other acceptable, they marry and enter the
labor market studied above. When a couple marries, two clones enter the
marriage market.
Although the equilibrium is of course impossible to characterize lacking
formal analysis, some general observations can be made.
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It is easy to show that V A00(pi; pi)  V B00 (pi; x5pi) if  is lower than or
equal to a certain constant ~: In this case, the preferred match for the pi is
pj = pi: Hence:
a) For a su¢ ciently high , all couples formed will be very homogenous as
people only marry those compatible partners with very similar productivities
to their own, and pL=pH ! 1. All existing couples will be of Type A.
b) For lower arrival rates, results are not so straightforward as results
i)  iii) above start to matter more in equilibrium. Nevertheless, there will
be increased heterogeneity among partners, and thus among couples.
Hence, the magnitude of the arrival rate of spouses (determined by =r)
can a¤ect the heterogeneity in terms of wages and search behavior of seem-
ingly equal individuals and/or couples. When nding a spouse is easy enough
(as =r gets large), all couples will be very homogenous. Alternatively, if
=r is low, the equilibrium exhibits heterogenous couples. We will observe a
dispersion of wages and search behavior across (seemingly equal individuals),
as well as a dispersion of combinations of wages and search behavior across
(seemingly equal) couples.
This introduces an additional source of ine¢ ciency when the arrival rate
of spouses is high: very productive individuals marry each other, only to have
half of them staying at home, while very unproductive individuals also marry
each other, to have half of them in the market. If the matching was not assor-
tative, and instead couples married agents with very di¤erent productivities,
one could have most of the highly productive individuals working and vice-
versa, with a higher average value across society. The optimum would be for
each person in the more productive half of population to marry somebody
from the least productive half, with only the former working in the long run,
and only the latter staying at home. With high , the equilibrium outcome
is the opposite.
For  > ~, then V A00(pj; pj) < V
B
00 (pj; x5pj). In this case, the preferred
match for the pi is pj = pix5   ". Hence:
a) When =r is high it is likely that people of su¢ ciently equal produc-
tivity do not marry (if anything because more productive of the two is less
likely to accept), and all marriages will be Type B. This is e¢ cient in the
sense that the low productivity worker will always end up engaged in home
production.
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b) For lower rates we should see people with equal productivity start
accepting each other, giving rise to an additional type of marriages (Type
A). Hence, there will be some market ine¢ ciencies, those related to type
A marriages. Further, this would enhance the heterogeneity in wages and
search behavior.
c) As the arrival rate keeps decreasing, we should see the other types of
marriages (C and D) starting to form.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a search model of the labor market where couples jointly
decide the labor supply and home production of each partner. We nd that
the equilibrium involves di¤erent job search strategies for di¤erent couples
and that, often, married agents stay at home. This is true even for the more
productive spouse within the household, or somebody who has relatively high
productivity among the population. Couples with similar productivities to
each other tend to choose strategies where both spouses behave symmetri-
cally, while asymmetric couples tend to have asymmetric strategies.
We nd that when couples are asymmetric, but not too much, rms may
nd it optimal to unilaterally increase an employees wage to induce the
partner to abandon the labor market in favor of home production, therefore
ensuring the employee will never quit. This generates multiple equilibria in
terms of wages and search behavior. The multiple equilibria results from the
feedback between a unilateral wage increase by the rm and the e¤ects of this
on a workers bargaining position: if rms follow this strategy in equilibrium,
this increases the workers bargaining position vis-a-vis an individual rm,
making the bribe required lower relative to the otherwise agreed wage, and
thus more likely to be optimal.
Since search strategies of individuals depend on the relative productiv-
ities in a couple, and wages are a¤ected by the labor market status of the
partner, it is also true that wages will depend on the labor market history
of the couple. Hence, our model provides an additional explanation for wage
heterogeneity for identical workers. This extends also to identical couples
(given di¤erent labor market histories). Such heterogeneity applies not only
to wages but also to search strategies.
We nd that, unambiguously, agents get better wage o¤ers when their
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spouses are working and this o¤er increases with the spouses wage, along
the lines of Korenman and Newmark (1991).
Our modelling of the labor market has interesting implications for class
formation as in Burdett and Coles (1997). Our results imply that, for newly
born couples, their assumptions do not apply. In our model, the value of a
marriage for individuals in newly born couples depends on the individuals
own productivity in addition to the partners productivity, and this value is
not monotonic on the partners productivity. As a result, di¤erent agents
di¤er on how they rank any two potential spouses, which is also at odds with
Burdett and Coles (1997).
When we do consider the possibility of marriage formation in the light of
the above, we nd our model tends to reconcile the results in Schwartz and
Mare (2005) when the job arrival rate is low. The implications about income
inequality do not necessarily follow. When the two spouses in the couple be-
have symmetrically in equilibrium, in about half the households at any given
time the less productive spouse is in the market and the more productive
one stays at home. This means the income distribution among households
may or may not be more unequal than the productivity distribution among
individuals. Thus, the results in Cancian et.al (1993) are also consistent with
our theoretical results.
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